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Abstract: Using India’s National Sample Survey data on consumption expenditure 
by households this paper examines how access to affordability of electricity services 
have fared under power sector reform programme that was pursued in the of State 
Orissa (India). To draw a comparative picture of Orissa with a state which did not 
follow the path of World Bank inspired restructuring of the power sector we use 
similar data for West Bengal (a proximate State to Orissa). Paper finds that 
increment in the access to electricity for the bottom 60 percent of the population has 
remained almost stagnant and the burden of electricity expenditure on the poor 
households has increased significantly. Compared to west Bengal much larger 
increase in the expenditure on electricity in Orissa by households having access to 
electricity clearly signifies that electricity reforms have led to considerable loss in the 
in consumers’ welfare. Paper uses concentration ratio method to elicit findings.  
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper intends to discuss how the access to and affordability of electricity by 
households belonging to different socio-economic status in Orissa have fared during 
the reform process. Orissa was one of the first states to bring in compressive reforms 
in the power sector. Here we compare Orissa with West Bengal because West Bengal 
did not introduce reform. After the reform various studies have come up but none of 
them have tried to see the impact of power sector reforms in such objective manner. 
After the initiation of the reform there has been significant increase in the tariffs of 
electricity.  
The three important exogenous channels through which the cost of supply of 
electricity has experienced manifold increase in Orissa are 
o increase in the rate of return that utility can earn, from 3 percent to 16 per cent  
o artificial revaluation of assets of power sector by two times and  
o Withdrawal of subsidy by the government.  
 
These changes presumably have led to tariff hikes that have considerably affected the 
access to and affordability of electricity to households. It was thought that efficiency 
gains in the operation after initiation of reform would offset such increase in costs. 
But this did not materialised as there were some endogenous factor within the reform 
model itself which led to increased cost of supply of power. The reform model was 
unable to target the serious ailments of the power sector in Orissa (Siddiqui 2005). 
The complex web of perverse incentives that existed in pre-reform era is still intact. 
Because of this, the generic problem of the power sector that is high transmission and 
distribution losses and low cash collection efficiency by the utility still persists 
(Siddiqui 2004 chapter 4 and 5).  
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2. What is a power sector reform? 
Power sector reforms in developing with initially having vertically integrated 
structure generally denotes three things  
1. The deintegration of publicly owned vertically integrated structures separate 
entities e.g., 
 Generation  
 Transmission and  
 Distribution 
Initially the three segments are separated and then horizontal deintegration of 
potentially competitive segments i.e., Generation and Distribution are done to 
foster competition. 
2. Privatisation of these separated units.  
3. Appointment of independent regulatory body which sets the tariff and monitors 
the performance of the private operators. 
4. Gradually introducing competition in potentially competitive segment, mainly 
generation 
 
 
In Orissa first three steps have been completed, in the name competition, reform 
document stated that grant of generating plants will be based on competitive bidding. 
Orissa Electrcity Board was fragmented in the following manner (see Appendix for 
chronology of implemtation) 
Figure1: Process of restructuring of Assets of OSEB 
OSEB
OHPC GRIDCO
CESCO NESCO WESCO SOUTHCO  
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After restructuring Orissa Power system may represented in following diagram  
 
Figure 2: Current Organisation of the Power industry in Orissa 
   
OPGC OHPC NTPC CPP Others
GRIDCO (single buyer)
CESCO NESCO WESCO SOUTHCO
OERC
 
 
 
Table1 represents the institutional framework of power sector in pre and post reform 
period in nutshell. 
 
Table 1: The Institutional framework of power sector  
in pre and post reform period 
Activity Pre-reform Post Reform 
1. Policy Making GoO, GoI GoO, GoI 
2. Regulation OSEB OERC 
3. Generation OSEB, OPGC OPGC, OHPC, 
4. Transmission OSEB GRIDCO 
5. Distribution and supply OSEB DISTCOs 
6. Tariff Structure Average Tariff Two part tariff 
 
One of the important reasons for privatisation obsessed reforms was ever worsening 
of fiscal health of the state. The Government of Orissa (GoO) found it increasingly 
difficult to finance development of power sector as other commitments on social 
sector was souring. The state of Orissa is one of the less developed states with highest 
poverty ratio
2
. Therefore the GoO anticipated that elimination of subsidies and 
proceeds from private participation in power sector would leave more resources in 
fiscal exchequer which can be reallocated to programmes whose incidence on poverty 
                                                 
2
 nearly 47 percent of Orissa‟s population still lives under the shackles of poverty (Panning 
Commission 2003, Chapter 8) 
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is more progressive than the original power sector investment and consumption 
subsidies. Estache, Foster and Wodon (2002) with the help of regional studies try to 
establish that shift of resources away from utility subsidies towards other programmes 
may benefit lower income groups. But there is no guarantee that public revenues will 
be reallocated in a pattern which is favourable to the poor. Staff Appraisal Report 
(SAR) also outlined similar argument for Orissa (World Bank 1996). But government 
actually may end spending more on power sector because of such privatisation policy 
do not work as anticipated. This is so primarily because the private participation is 
conditioned upon the guarantees and counter guarantees. In case these guarantees are 
revoked, this may lead to further erosion of the public finances, which actually has 
happened. For example, Independent Power Producers (IPP) programme has added 
considerable financial burden to the few well performing SEBs like Maharashtra, 
Gujarat and Karnataka (Morris 2000).  
 
This paper consists of seven sections. The next section gives the description on data 
used in the study. Then we deal with access to and affordability of electricity to 
households in third and fourth sections respectively. In fifth section we measure the 
inequality in the access to and affordability of electricity. The last section concludes. 
 
3 Data and Method 
 
We use the 50th and 55th rounds of the consumption expenditure survey of the National 
Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) conducted in 1993-94 and 1999-00.These 
surveys are conducted during the agricultural year in India, which begins in July and 
ends in the month of June of the following year. The national sample survey uses a 
stratified two-stage sampling design, first sampling clusters (which are villages in 
rural areas and urban blocks in urban areas) and then selecting 10 (or 12 as in the case 
of the 55th round) households within each cluster (called first-stage sampling units or 
FSUs). The survey elicits consumption expenditures and consumption quantity for the 
household for the month preceding the date of survey. The date of survey varies 
between the FSUs as the survey is done at four different times (corresponding to 
quarters) within the 12 months from July to June. 
We have selected two states for our analysis. One is obviously Orissa and the second 
is West Bengal. Our objective here is to see what would have happened to the changes 
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in access to electricity and expenditure on electricity by households if reform had not 
taken place in Orissa during this time period of analysis. In order to do such analysis, 
we have West Bengal, which is similar to Orissa in many aspects of culture, habit and 
physical geography (weather) but has not reformed its power sector. Therefore we 
have taken West Bengal for a comparison with Orissa. Table 2 shows the number of 
households that were surveyed. 
Table 2: Number of Households Surveyed 
 Orissa West Bengal 
Round Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
50th 3,338 1,037 4,375 4,480 3,338 7,818 
55th 3,477 1,049 4,526 4,549 3,432 7,981 
Source: NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure 
 
We make use of consumption expenditure data for our purpose. We divide the whole 
sample into quintiles based on their household monthly total consumption expenditure 
(HMCE) in increasing order to have a measure of economic status of the households. 
The first quintile represents the bottom 20 percent of households with the lowest 
HMCE and fifth quintile represents top 20 percent of households with the highest 
HMCE.  
 
Table 2 gives the quintile wise HMCE of the two states. The HMCE of Orissa 
remains lower for all the quintiles in both the periods (for both rural and urban) 
compared to West Bengal. As expected, rural HMCE is always lower than the urban 
HMCE. It is important here to note that the annual growth rate of HMCE for all the 
quintiles  (for both rural and urban areas) in both the states were quite the same, i.e., 
around 40 percent mark (based on current prices). Another remarkable feature of 
Table 3 is that the co-efficient of variation of the HMCE secularly declines as we 
move from lower quintile to the higher quintile, irrespective of region and time. This 
means that inequality in HMCE is severe among the poor.  
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Table 3: Average household monthly total consumption expenditure (HMCE) and its 
co-efficient of variation (CV) for 1993-94 and 1999-2000 (Rs) 
 Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Quintile Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV 
 
Orissa 1993-94 West Bengal 1993-94 
1 377.76 1.43 564.92 0.95 391.70 1.38 569.90 0.96 587.11 0.93 573.90 0.95 
2 649.29 0.83 1007.55 0.54 678.39 0.80 892.58 0.61 1040.71 0.52 918.66 0.59 
3 874.91 0.62 1460.85 0.37 924.75 0.58 1162.31 0.47 1511.41 0.36 1227.65 0.44 
4 1179.32 0.46 2069.85 0.26 1269.22 0.43 1512.91 0.36 2173.02 0.25 1659.16 0.33 
5 2089.85 0.26 3593.36 0.15 2392.65 0.23 2817.17 0.19 4232.75 0.13 3284.17 0.17 
Total 1034.49 0.52 1742.88 0.31 1131.56 0.48 1391.38 0.39 1909.96 0.29 1532.91 0.36 
 
Orissa 1999-2000 West Bengal 1999-2000 
1 644.98 1.34 919.18 0.94 675.44 1.28 1050.85 1.17 1169.07 1.05 1070.66 1.15 
2 1069.02 0.81 1583.39 0.55 1122.86 0.77 1581.78 0.78 2020.55 0.61 1654.66 0.74 
3 1444.80 0.60 2255.61 0.38 1540.59 0.56 2044.85 0.60 2811.42 0.44 2179.91 0.56 
4 1942.92 0.45 3108.51 0.28 2123.74 0.41 2622.83 0.47 3967.58 0.31 2874.23 0.43 
5 3522.65 0.25 5672.41 0.15 4006.13 0.22 4277.59 0.29 7710.19 0.16 5317.28 0.23 
Total 1725.55 0.50 2710.03 0.32 1894.08 0.46 2316.00 0.53 3538.26 0.35 2625.74 0.47 
Source: Calculated from NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure 
 
To have further idea about the distribution of HMCE, we calculated the Gini 
coefficient
3
, which is shown in Table 4. We see that the value of Gini co-efficient is 
usually higher in the case of Orissa. 
 
Inequality in HMCE in case of Orissa has remained more or less same at around 0.30 
during the period of analysis. For West Bengal Gini co-efficient shows a marginal 
increase in aggregate but for urban areas it increased drastically during the same 
period and that of rural area it shows a marginal decline. Thus, we see that Orissa is 
characterised by low expenditure level with relatively high inequality. This may serve 
as good background information when we focus on the issues of access and 
affordability on the basis socio-economic status. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
3
 We use the formula  of Gini coefficient G =1 - Pi (Zi + Zi-1) where Zi is is the cumulative share of 
expenditure made by households and Pi is the share of population in each quintile (Pi =0.2) 
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Table 4: Gini co-efficient of average household monthly total consumption 
expenditure for 1993-94 and 1999-2000 
 Rural Urban Total 
 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 
Orissa 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.31 
West Bengal 0.29 0.27 0.11 0.26 0.25 0.26 
Source: Calculated from NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure 
 
4 Issues in Access to Electricity 
 
“In industrialised countries, the majority of citizens have access to modern 
infrastructure services, and regulatory strategy focuses on overseeing established 
industries and customer relationships. In contrast, large proportions of the populations 
of developing countries lack access to any formal infrastructure services. Two billion 
people lack access to adequate sanitation, two billion lack access to electricity, and 
one billion, access to clean water. Transportation and communication networks also 
remain poorly developed. Those living in urban slums and in rural communities are 
least likely to have access. The effectiveness of any pro-poor regulatory strategy must 
thus be tested against the goal of expanding access to services, rather than just 
improving the convenience of those who already have service” (Smith 2000: 6).  
 
A substantial proportion of the poorest households lack access to basic energy supply 
through traditional utilities for their cooking and lighting purposes and consequently 
must find substitutes like kerosene, firewood or coal to meet their energy needs. 
Ironically, these fuels are often provided through informal means and involve high 
cost and risk (Estache, Foster and Wodon 2002). In rural areas, often children 
especially girls of poor households are responsible for collecting the firewood. This 
adversely affects their allocation of time on education, which ultimately affects their 
educational attainment. In addition to this, with passage of time, access to such 
resources is getting reduced due to strict rules and regulations increasingly being 
implemented to protect wild life and forests. This raises the cost of substitutes. 
Similarly, in urban areas where Kerosene is major source of cooking and is supposed 
to be provided by the Public Distribution System (PDS) is often not sufficient in 
quantity to meet the requirement. In most of the cases the poor do not get the 
mandated or rationed quantity because owners of public distribution outlet often tend 
to sell it illegally in the open market for higher prices. As a result, the poor 
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households have to buy kerosene from open market, which is priced exorbitantly high 
in comparison to the PDS price. Households having no usual utility connection for its 
energy requirement face double disadvantage – one is high cost of procuring the fuels 
and another is the negative impact of indoor environmental externalities associated 
with such fuels. Usage of kerosene and firewood produces shoots, which adversely 
affects the respiratory system if inhaled. Those who mostly stay at home and take part 
in cooking, generally women, inhale most part of this shoot.  
Two main types of access issues can result from power sector reform and private 
sector participation. 
1. Potential increase in connection fees  
2. Reluctance of the utilities to serve the poor 
 
Privately operated utilities can charge substantial one-time connection charges to 
cover the cost of network expansion. In addition, households may have to make 
significant investment in wiring their homes to reap the benefits of the electricity 
connection. These costs can be prohibitively very high for low-income customers, 
preventing them from being connected to the network, once it has been built. Reform 
process must take into account the potential obstacles or access costs and try to reduce 
them. Often poor households in urban areas in order to minimize one time payment 
problem get connection from a near by household which is already electrified. 
Therefore their access to electricity will subsist on the whims of another person. 
 
Private utilities on the other hand have no incentives to serve customers in whose case 
cost of provision exceeds the tariff that they pay. Poor customers are relatively costly 
to serve for several reasons. First, higher commercial risk and billing costs may be 
associated with recovering revenues from customers with limited ability to pay. 
Second, poor neighbourhoods are often located in geographically challenging areas 
for a utility service provider, i.e., places where it is costly to establish and maintain 
distribution network like hilly regions. Thirdly, poor households often consume 
relatively smaller quantity of service, i.e., the loads are very thinly distributed, 
meaning that fixed cost of service provision are spread over a relatively small number 
of units of demand resulting in higher average fixed cost. Cross-subsidies may 
exacerbate this problem by reducing the amount of revenue that can be collected from 
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them, thereby, making poor households even more commercially unattractive to 
serve. Thus, once competition or third party sale, is introduced, new entrants may be 
tempted to “cream-skim” or acquire only those customers whose tariffs exceed their 
true cost of provision e.g., industry, commerce and traction, leaving the incumbent 
utilities (SEBs) with customers who are uneconomic to serve, e.g., households and 
agriculture. It is because of this fear that the Electricity Act 2003 envisaged 
introduction of competition only after phasing out cross subsidies. 
 
4.1 Trends in Access Rates 
To assess the change in access due to introduction of reform, here we are taking two 
time points, before reform and after reform. We make use of the NSS data on 
electricity expenditure by households in Orissa and West Bengal. We use the two 
round data on consumer expenditure, one is 50
th
 round (1993-94) and the second is 
55
th
 round (1999-2000). We compare the level of access in different HMCE quintiles 
before and after reform situation. To make it sure that changes in the access rate is 
due to reform in the power sector and not just a macro level changes in the economy, 
we have taken access rates for West Bengal, which has not reformed its power sector 
but otherwise faces similar macroeconomic environment. In order to obtain the extent 
of access rates for each quintile we take number of individuals having access to 
electricity service as percentage of total population of that particular quintile. 
 
Our analysis shows that access level is very low in both the states. The trends in 
access rates show that the increase in access rates during this period is higher for West 
Bengal in comparison to Orissa for almost all quintile classes in both urban and rural 
areas (Table 5). This trend exists except for top 20 percent of population in rural area 
where Orissa‟s access rate is better. The improvement in access for bottom 60 percent 
of the population in Orissa is marginal but improvements in West Bengal for the same 
section of population is significant as it can be seen in Table 5. 
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Table:5: Quintile wise trends in access rates (%) 
 Rural Urban Total 
Quantile 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 
Orissa 
1 2.32 2.25 30.28 39.08 3.75 5.07 
2 4.62 8.19 37.72 40.35 6.81 12.37 
3 8.77 10.23 56.76 57.05 12.67 16.94 
4 13.97 18.62 73.89 78.75 20.69 27.01 
5 35.33 46.18 83.65 89.59 50.88 61.68 
Total 13.01 17.11 56.50 60.99 18.96 24.62 
West Bengal 
1 3.38 8.25 33.43 53.24 10.93 16.95 
2 3.51 13.00 43.64 61.33 9.75 20.64 
3 7.04 17.64 65.97 78.31 17.50 26.67 
4 11.98 21.58 80.71 87.70 29.35 38.66 
5 29.31 38.77 92.86 94.95 59.05 66.02 
Total 11.05 19.85 63.34 75.13 25.32 33.86 
Source: Calculated from NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure 
 
NSS data showing lower achievement by Orissa in terms of access is because there 
was no deliberate attempt to extend electricity supply to more houses under the 
reform programme. In fact, the access to poorest 20 percent of population, which was 
already at very low level (2.32 percent) in rural area, has further declined (to 2.25 
percent). Access to electricity, as expected, moves with economic status. But it is 
notable here that even within the same quintile a household having no access to 
electricity is more likely to have low economic status (measured by consumption 
expenditure) in comparison to those who have electricity connection. In NSS sample 
the average HMCE of households without access to electricity are generally lower 
when compared to that of households with access to electricity with few exceptions 
(appendix 2).  
 
Negligible increments in access rates in case of Orissa clearly shows the neglect of the 
government to mitigate the possible negative effect of increase in tariff rates might 
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have had. The subsidy from the government to power sector was reduced to zero. 
Government of Orissa was so conservative that it did not release any additional fund 
to restore the network even after the heavy cyclone in 1999, which affected network 
of the DISTCOs (Ramanathan and Hassan 2003).  
 
The trends in access show that there is need to design policies to extend access to 
large sections of the society. Therefore, the following section is devoted to discuss the 
possible ways that can be explored to extend the access to electricity at universal 
level. 
 
4.2 Instruments for Facilitating Access 
 
Selection of instruments for improving access may have important implication for the 
distribution companies, government and the consumers. Instruments requiring the 
companies to electrify all the households irrespective of their capacity to pay may be a 
burden for the company. But if it is not so, several households may remain without 
electrification. So the basic philosophy of public policy is to choose instruments, 
which induce the stakeholders of the industry to spend maximum in terms of money 
and effort within their reachable capacity. In other words, policy makers have to 
design a policy framework where rent seeking behaviour of the stakeholders are 
minimised. In case government is not able to meet its objective of universal access to 
electricity even after designing such policy because of the low capacity to pay by the 
some consumers then subsidy might be targeted to such consumers only.  
 
Instruments Requiring Distribution Companies to Provide Access 
(a) Service Obligation: The most common way to introduce commitment is by 
specifying universal service obligations (USOs). USOs provide a legal expression to 
social objective of bringing electricity to all households. Such objective can also be 
justified in terms of social benefit of universal coverage i.e. the positive externalities 
associated with electricity consumption on development. Rural electrification is 
viewed as prime mover of rural development. Electricity is not only the basic pre-
requisite for industrialisation but also contributes significantly to increasing 
agricultural productivity, jobs and income generation activities besides enhancing the 
quality of life in rural areas and controlling migration from rural to urban areas (MoP 
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2003). The obligations can be defined in variety of ways and is often expressed in 
vague languages. In typical formulation a distribution company (DISTCO) is required 
to provide the connection to all households or all those who request the service. The 
obligation may be unidirectional i.e. incumbent only upon the DISTCO or bi-
directional meaning that the customer is also obliged to connect once the service has 
been made available. 
 
Unfortunately because of their vagueness, USOs often raise as many questions as they 
answer. USOs may not be truly operational on its own. Limitations in the coverage of 
the network may make fulfilling the obligation a physical impossibility in the short 
run even in communities already linked to the network and access charges may render 
a connection unaffordable making the obligation irrelevant. These concerns highlight 
the need to complement a USO with requirements that specify the obligations in more 
detail and how obligation has to be financed when customers lack ability to pay. The 
financing of obligation is real challenge not only due to lack of availability of money 
but also because of incentive. The instrument should be designed in such a way that 
there is enough incentive for the households not to underreport their capacity to pay, 
which might be very challenging in practice. The Electricity Act 2003 has tried to 
bring in all possible ways of electrifying the population. It encompasses various 
methods and institutions that might get involved in the process of rural electrification. 
The Act has proposed that in case of geographically challenging areas, off grid 
possibilities mostly with renewable energy sources can also be explored. The act also 
envisages the possibility of involving the local community along with Non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the process of electrification (see para 4, 5 
and 6 of part II of the Act).  
 
(b) Connection Targets: This is a gradual approach to USO. Here the DISTCO is 
obliged to meet certain connection targets and may concentrate more clearly on the 
issue of who has to be connected. Targets may also be necessary to ensure that 
coverage is provided to customer groups that are unprofitable to serve. Targets have 
the advantage of being easy to monitor and therefore can be imposed by financial 
penalty. However, connection targets can only be met if customers take up the 
service, which will not always be the case. Consumers may not be taking up the 
service because of unaffordable access charges. Thus, any serious attempt to increase 
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coverage among poor households may require a serious assessment of connection 
charges. Government of India has embarked upon a gradual approach of 
electrification process. The initial target is to electrify 100 per of villages in India by 
the end of tenth plan (2007) and then it will focus on electrifying 100 per cent of 
households by the end of the eleventh five year plan (2012) (MoP 2003). . 
 
Instruments Reducing Connection Cost 
There are four main strategies for reducing connection cost 
 Spreading the connection cost over time through design of financing arrangements 
 Cross-subsidising between new and existing consumers. 
 Using connection subsidies. 
 Using off grid electrification technologies in case of geographically challenging 
areas. 
 
(c) Financing Arrangements: Many low-income households lack savings to pay 
connection costs up-front but may be able to afford the cost if they were spread across 
a number of instalments. We see such financing instruments used by non-food 
consumer goods industry in marketing their products. Because the poor pose a high 
credit risk and they lack collateral, such household lacks access to loans as well. In 
such cases government can play a crucial role in financing the electrification process. 
It can design flexible financing arrangements suited to the poor sections of the 
society. But here again policy makers have to be careful for the recovery of the loan 
amount. Often loans provided by government owned banks for development purposes 
have usually failed in recovery.  
 
(d) Cross-subsidisation: Cross-subsidy is a very important tool especially, in the cases 
of the fiscal constraint and help in redistribution of the wealth across the society.  This 
can be seen as one of the important tools for reducing inequality in the society 
provided that beneficiaries are clearly defined and it is made sure that their benefits 
flow only to intended customers. But we have considered the following points to 
confirm the feasibility of such subsidy schemes. 
 As long as the size of unconnected population is small relative to the 
connected population, cross-subsidisation spreads the cost of network over a 
 15 
much larger population and generally at a reasonably low cost to each 
household. The charge that each household pays to be connected is reduced 
and become sustainable economically and politically. 
 Cross subsidies towards new connections are in many cases more likely to 
reach the poor, because those lacking connections are predominantly poor. 
 Sector becomes self-sufficient therefore no burden for exchequer. 
 Cross-subsidisation to new connections may be justified on ethical grounds. 
The fact that already connected households, enjoying the consumption subsidy 
since long time is more likely to be rich households while the other 
households which are not connected to the network enjoy no subsidy. 
Santhakumar (2003) has shown that how middle-income class of Kerala, a 
majority in terms of vote bank, who can very well afford cost reflective price 
of electricity has influenced the government of Kerala to keep the tariffs for 
them at low levels. 
 By reallocating a significant proportion of connection cost to richer 
households, regulator actually reduces the collection risk of the utility leading 
to better collection efficiency. 
 Success of a cross-subsidy regime largely depends upon the elasticity of 
demand and cost of service to the subsidising category of consumers. The 
lower the price elasticity of demand higher will be the leverage for utility to 
charge higher prices thus the cross-subsidy. (Chattopadhyay 2004). 
 
5. The Issue of Affordability 
Reforms and private sector participation can give rise to the following broad sources 
of affordability restriction 
 Tariff increases needed to cover the costs 
 Increase in cost caused by increased rate of return requirement 
 Reduction in cross subsidy along with withdrawal of subsidy.   
 Revaluation of asset value of the DISTCO 
Theoretically as the Staff Appraisal Report (World Bank 1996) argued that reform has 
the potential to reduce the cost of service provision, but the current experience shows 
that cost has escalated instead of declining. It seems that the time when people of 
Orissa will be able to claim benefits of efficiency improvements is quite far. The 
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above mentioned reasons for the increase in the cost of electricity were true in case of 
Orissa. Among them most important was upvaluation the assets of erstwhile OSEB to 
earn more proceeds from privatisation so that GoO could finance its fiscal deficit. 
 
At the time of privatisation governments has choice between fixing a relatively high 
tariff and the auctioning of the assets of ESI to private party on the basis of highest 
bidder or waiving the asset value altogether and auctioning of the services to private 
party who bids lowest tariffs. In one case government directly appropriates the asset 
value and finances the fiscal deficits that results in high tariff. In the second case, the 
asset value is given as capital subsidy to people resulting in lower tariffs. In the first 
case, high tariff can be viewed as a tax on consumers to fund the fiscal deficit through 
a high sale value of a company rather than because of privatisation. In most cases of 
private sector participation governments are choosing the first option because they are 
more interested in relieving fiscal constraint than that of securing tariff reductions 
(Guasch 2000). In fact, government of Orissa went one step ahead to tax people by 
revaluing the assets of ESI to double without any additional physical investment. In 
constrained fiscal environment selling enterprises in the name of reform through first 
option turns out to be an obvious perversion. Similar divestment strategy for utility 
services was also adopted by the many developing countries during the difficult fiscal 
situations. 
 
5.1 Impact on Affordability 
To see the possible impact on affordability, we use the NSS collected data for the 
same rounds as we did in the case of access. Here we use mean expenditure made on 
electricity by each quintile group ranked in increasing order of their HMCE as a proxy 
for affordability. While calculating mean expenditure made on electricity, we take 
into account only those households, which have positive expenditure on electricity. 
We have ignored all households showing either zero or no expenditure on electricity 
assuming that they do not have access to electricity
4
. An ideal way to assess the 
impact on affordability would be to see changes in units of electricity consumed 
                                                 
4
 But there are houses, which show that their main source of lighting is electricity, but they do not 
report any expenditure on electricity. We have ignored such households in calculating mean as they  
might pull down the representative average. Those households might be illegally connected to the grid 
or might have connection offered by the institution where members of these households are employed.  
Moreover these kinds of houses constitute very small proportion of the sample. 
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during the period of reform. But data on units of electricity consumed is not reliable 
as there are lot of missing cells under this column in data sheet even when households 
are showing positive expenditure on electricity. Therefore, we use expenditure on 
electricity, which is product of price and units of electricity consumed. Table 6 gives 
the average share of electricity expenditure in HMCE of households belonging to 
different quintiles. 
 
Table 6: Share of expenditure on electricity in total consumption expenditure (%). 
 Rural Urban Total 
Quintile 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 
Orissa 
1 6.06 10.66 1.45 5.32 5.31 8.48 
2 6.73 5.76 1.89 7.22 5.92 5.38 
3 6.87 6.20 2.38 5.22 6.07 6.34 
4 5.44 5.38 2.53 4.72 4.86 5.39 
5 3.36 4.22 2.37 3.40 3.13 3.96 
Total 3.96 4.61 3.37 4.29 3.69 4.47 
West Bengal 
1 3.46 3.84 3.30 4.47 3.38 4.18 
2 2.43 3.18 3.32 3.75 3.01 3.45 
3 2.55 2.89 3.06 3.90 3.01 3.25 
4 2.25 2.61 2.90 3.83 2.70 3.28 
5 1.44 2.29 2.79 3.72 2.41 3.32 
Total 1.70 2.54 2.90 3.80 2.54 3.34 
Source: Calculated from NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure 
 
Table 6 shows that there is drastic increase in the share of expenditure on electricity 
by households in the case of urban Orissa especially for the bottom 60 per cent of the 
population. In rural Orissa the share of expenditure on electricity has marginally 
declined from second quintile to fourth quintile but there is a drastic increase in the 
first quintile (from 6.06 per cent to 10.66 percent). The share of expenditure on 
electricity in rural Orissa is considerable high even in the initial level (before reform) 
when compared to west Bengal in all cases. Within Orissa the jump is larger in case 
of urban areas. This might happen because of two reasons- (a) the increment in 
households‟ total consumption expenditure in case of West Bengal is higher and  (b) 
increase in the price of electricity is higher in case of Orissa. So both the factors were 
working against Orissa. Share of expenditure on electricity in HMCE indicates the 
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burden of expenditure on electricity for households. But it would be important to 
know the actual level of expenditure on electricity so that we can compare the two 
states in different time points. 
 
In Table 7 provides average household expenditure made on electricity. There is 
drastic increase in the expenditure on electricity in both the states but it is more so in 
case of Orissa. This average expenditure can increase due to three factors. One is 
increases in access rates, second is increase in the prices and third is increase in 
consumption or due to cumulative effect of all the factors together. 
 
Table 7: Quintile wise average expenditure on electricity (Rs) 
 1993-94 1999-2000 
Quintile Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Orissa 
1 23.52 8.43 20.67 73.24 50.93 61.62 
2 43.75 19.17 40.31 61.75 115.11 60.84 
3 61.99 35.26 57.30 88.51 117.94 99.78 
4 65.22 52.76 63.39 105.42 147.39 118.45 
5 77.91 84.68 81.18 161.27 192.96 168.55 
Total 67.22 71.05 68.78 128.24 138.73 132.86 
West Bengal 
1 21.07 19.97 20.13 42.15 52.10 45.15 
2 21.71 35.41 28.09 50.48 76.41 57.62 
3 30.13 46.87 37.60 59.19 110.46 71.44 
4 34.31 63.40 45.72 69.09 152.60 95.61 
5 42.57 119.97 82.32 100.49 289.04 186.69 
Total 36.55 68.13 58.11 74.93 151.68 118.09 
Source: Calculated from NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure 
 
We have already seen that access rates have remained more or less stagnant for 
bottom three quintiles of Orissa but access rates in West Bengal are increasing over 
time (Table 5). So one can say that drastic increase in the expenditure on electricity in 
the case of Orissa is due to either increase in the prices or increase in the consumption 
of electricity of those households who already have electricity connection. Moreover, 
it is a well known fact that the price increase was more prominent than increase in the 
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units consumed in the case of Orissa. So it can now be established that the increase in 
expenditure on electricity for the bottom 60 percent (first three quintiles) of the 
population is largely on account of increase in the prices but for the top 40 per cent of 
the population it might be due to all the three factors. On the other hand, increments in 
the total consumption expenditure by households are higher, in absolute terms, in the 
case of West Bengal, which was already at high level in the initial period (Table 3). 
Therefore, we see that the poor in Orissa had to spend a higher proportion of their 
income on electricity. 
 
5.2 Instrument for Promoting Affordability  
Targeted Subsidies: Targeting subsidy for poor has been one of the most challenging 
jobs for most of the public supported programmes. Often they do not hit the target. 
One of the famous cases is of public distribution system in India where we see 
pervasive targeting errors of wrong inclusion and exclusion.  
 
Electricity subsidy in India has been mainly dependent on category of consumers 
rather than income or socio-economic characteristics. Agricultural and domestic 
consumer are cross-subsidised by other categories of consumers. If one is agricultural 
consumer, he is entitled to subsidised power irrespective of his socio-economic status. 
This kind of subsidies can in fact be detrimental for poor households who are 
basically subsistence farmers and largely depend on human power for their 
agricultural activities. They are unable to utilise the benefit of the electricity subsidies 
because they can not afford and find it uneconomical to buy a pump-set because of 
their small land holding. During the dry season big farmers drag groundwater with the 
help of subsidised power to take groundwater level further down which was already at 
a very low level because of vagaries of weather. As a result, all the wells from where 
small farmers draw water with the help of human power to irrigate their fields get 
dried. Now only option left for such farmer in order to save his crop is to buy water 
from big farmer who can draw water from far below with the help of subsidised 
power. In this unorganised water market, small farmer often becomes the victim of 
market power of the large farmers. At the end of the day we see that electricity 
subsidy helps in widening inequality rather than reducing it along with indiscriminate 
extraction of precious natural resource like ground water. Jain (2003), in the case of 
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Punjab, has shown that poor farmers remain worse while the big farmers utilise the 
benefits of the electricity subsidy. 
 
In the case of household consumers, a similar story follows. One big source of 
inequality is that a large proportion of poor household both in urban and rural is not 
having access to electricity. Electricity subsidy is provided to all household 
consumers irrespective of their socio-economic characteristics. Since subsidy is based 
on the consumption, those who can consume more electricity enjoy more subsidies. It 
is natural to expect that richer household will be having more electronic gadgets than 
a poor household. Those who are not having access to electricity they enjoy zero 
subsidy and those who have access to electricity enjoy positive subsidy. The actual 
amount of subsidy enjoyed by household will be directly proportional to its connected 
load. That is the more you demand electricity the more you get electricity subsidy. 
This is quite in contrast to the policy objective.  
 
Therefore, during the reform era there is need to re-look at these ill-designed subsidy 
schemes. If we go through the following truth, it is relatively easy to target poor for 
electricity consumption than any other commodity or service. In urban India poor 
generally live in pockets. Electricity can be consumed only when one is connected to 
the network. So it is easy to verify whether the connected consumer belongs to area 
where poor live or not especially when the bills are being delivered on the spot. It will 
be easier for the billing authorities to know socio-economic status of the house as the 
billing authority can very well see the housing condition. Similar ways pricing is 
being worked for Delhi.  
 
5.3 Priority in Subsidy 
The policy question relevant here is whether to emphasise subsidy for new 
connections or consumption subsidies among those already benefiting from 
connections. Discussions in above sections indicate that it is reasonable to have 
primary focus on access. Moreover access subsidy is more likely to reach the intended 
population (poor) in comparison to affordability subsidy. Jain (2003: 139), in context 
of agricultural consumers of Punjab, demonstrated that poor do have willingness as 
well as capacity to pay for electricity because they generally spend more on the 
inferior quality substitutes of electricity e.g., diesel. But after the reforms, 
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affordability also became important consideration due to unprecedented rise in tariffs. 
Orissa‟s agricultural connected load is experiencing downtrend and growth of 
household consumers‟ connected load is quite low when compared to before reform 
situation (see Sidiqui 2004: chapter 4, section 4.2). Concerns over this was reflected 
by deliberate attempt to keep the prices of the electricity lowest through various ways 
suggested by Kanungo Committee Report (GoO 2001). Recently in order to increase 
the access, Department of Energy, government Orissa has embarked upon the mass 
scale rural electrification programme. But the policy should be tilted towards 
rationalising the electricity tariffs in such a way that cross subsidies are designed on 
the basis of economic status of the consumers. Very low levels of access among the 
poor is an immediate factor to which policy should respond as these household may 
fall in other kinds of deprivation due to lack of access. 
 
The lack of access may be either due to demand side or supply side problems. 
Alternatively household may not be having electricity connection either because the 
connection is not possible, i.e., village or hamlet is not electrified or household is not 
connected to grid even though the hamlet is having electricity connection. It is 
important to identify the two situations because it suggests the nature of intervention 
required. The first situation suggests the need of supply side intervention and second 
the need for demand side support measures. In Orissa, only 34 percent of households 
are electrified in the so called „electrified villages‟. Though one might assume the 
urban centres are mostly electrified but we find several households are yet to have 
electricity connection as shown in section 4. This suggests the need for demand side 
support measures. On the other hand the stagnation in the progress of rural 
electrification after the initiation of reform, suggests intervention of supply side 
policies. 
We have seen that access is usually higher for higher HMCE households (for quintile 
wise HMCE see Table 3). Though we have got an idea of inequitable distribution of 
access and expenditure burden on households. Here we go for an accurate measure for 
inequality so that we are able to compare the inequalities existing in different 
situations. 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 
6 Measuring Inequality in Access to and Affordability Electricity 
For a long time literature on measuring inequality have evolved specially in the area 
of income and health care. Our aim here is to use similar measures to the capture the 
inequality of access to and affordability of electricity among people of different 
economic status. This is being done here with the objective of examining the impact 
of reform. A variety of measures of inequality may be used be to measure inequalities 
in access to and affordability of electricity. Wagstaff et.al. (1991) argued that an index 
of inequality should satisfy the following three basic requirements, (1) it should 
reflect the socio-economic dimensions of inequalities; (2) it should reflect the 
experiences of the entire population; and (3) it should be sensitive to changes in the 
distribution of the population across socio-economic groups. Most of the measures 
fail to satisfy the all three requirements.
5
. The only two indices that satisfy all the 
three criteria are the relative index of inequality and the concentration index. The 
added advantages of using concentration index are (1) it is related to relative index of 
inequality (2) it has more immediate visual appeal; (3) if can also be estimated using 
regression method analysis, standard errors can be computed, based on which 
statistical tests can also be conducted to check of dominance relationship; and (4) it 
has a firm grounding in the literature on income distribution.
6
  
 
Inequality in Access to Electricity: 
Let us assume that we have information about the economic status of individuals 
using, which we use to rank them, and divide the sample into N groups (say quintiles, 
deciles or fractiles). We then estimate the proportion of population having access to 
electricity for whole as well as for each quintile separately. 
 
                                                 
5
 Measures like Gini coefficient fail to distinguish between a situation where the persons without access 
are millionaires or very poor when examining access inequality. Such cases generally does not arise in 
electricity but never the less these properties are desired even in case of access to electricity and more 
so in case of burden of expenditure on electricity.  
6
 For a review and comparison of properties of concentration index with alternative measures of health 
inequality, see Wagstaff, Paci and van Doorslaer (1991). 
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The concentration curve L(P) , shows the cumulative proportion of people having 
access to electricity by individuals against the cumulative proportion of population 
ranked by economic status beginning with the poorest (refer Figure 3). Unlike Lorenz 
curve, we are not ranking the variable whose distribution we are examining rather we 
are looking at the distribution of access to electricity across the population grouped by 
economic status. If L(P) coincides with the diagonal, all groups irrespective of their  
economic status show same level of access to electricity. If L(P) lies above the 
diagonal, inequalities in access favours the poor and in such cases it is called 
inequality pro-poor. If L(P) lies below the diagonal, the distribution of access to 
electricity is pro-rich. The farther the L(P) lies from the diagonal, the greater the 
degree of inequality in access to electricity across economic status. 
Figure 3: Concentration curve of access to electricity 
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Suppose the concentration curves of two states A and B lies below the diagonal. Now 
if the concentration curve of state A lies everywhere above the concentration curve of 
state B, then we say state A‟s concentration curve dominates that of state B. It seems 
reasonable to unambiguously conclude that there is less inequality in access electricity 
in state A than in state B. 
 
When two concentration curves intersect each other, we need to have a single measure 
to check their dominance. Concentration index (CI) is used for that purpose. It is 
defined as twice the area between L(P) and the diagonal. CI is zero when L(P) 
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coincides with the diagonal, negative when L(P) lies above the diagonal and positive 
when L(P) lies below the diagonal. In general, with N economic groups, CI can be 
expressed as  
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Where, h = average access to electricity of households, pn = proportion of n
th
 group 
population in total population; hn = Access to electricity of households in the n
th
 group  
Rn = Relative rank of the nth group; Where n = 1,…, N. The value of CI can range 
from  minus one to plus one  i.e, –1   CI   1. 
 
Based on the above method, we calculate the concentration index of access to 
electricity for Orissa and West Bengal for the year 1993-94 and 1999-2000. Table 8 
represents the value of concentration index of access to electricity. 
Table 8: Concentration index for access to electricity for 1993-94 and 1999-2000 
 Rural Urban Total 
Sector 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 
West Bengal 0.44 0.28 0.20 0.12 0.37 0.27 
Orissa 0.46 0.46 0.20 0.18 0.46 0.42 
 Source: Calculated from NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure. 
The Table 8 shows that inequality in access to electricity is quite high in Orissa 
(CI=0.46) and the performance in reducing that also is marginal during the period of 
reform. But the reduction in inequality is higher in case of West Bengal, which was 
having already less inequality in the initial year (CI = 0.37). We see a drastic decline 
of inequality in access to electricity in rural West Bengal from 0.44 to 0.28 while the 
value of the concentration ratio has remained stagnant at 0.46 for Orissa, which can be 
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considered as pretty high. In urban sector also, West Bengal has sharper reduction in 
the value of the concentration ratio when compared to Orissa. In the case of West 
Bengal the reduction is of 8 percentage points while for Orissa of the reduction is of 
only 2 percentage points from the same initial level,  i.e., 0.80. Therefore, the need of 
the hour is to first ensure the access to poor sections of the rural areas as, the 
concentration ratio of access rate is still very high in rural Orissa. For visual clarity 
one can look that concentration curve given in the figures 4.1 to 4.6 
 
Figure 4: Concentration Curve for Access to Electricity 
Fig 4.1: Rural Orissa
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Fig 4.2: Rural West Bengal
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Fig 4.3: Urban Orissa
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Fig 4.4 Urban West Bengal
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Fig 4.5: Total Orissa
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Fig 4.6: Total West Bengal
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5
Houesholds
A
c
e
s
s
 t
o
 e
le
c
tr
ic
it
y
Line of Equality 1993-94 1999-2000
 
Inequality in Affordability of Electricity: 
Based on the similar method, Table 9 gives the concentration index of affordability of 
electricity.  
Table 9: Concentration index for expenditure on electricity 
 Rural Urban Total 
 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 1993-94 1999-2000 
Orissa 0.19 0.37 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.21 
West Bengal 0.15 0.32 0.27 0.17 0.32 0.28 
Source: Calculated from NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure. 
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It is to remind that we use expenditure on electricity by households as proxy for 
affordability. It is important to note here that the CI is calculated by using the average 
expenditure on electricity by those households who have access to electricity (this is 
given in Table 7). The interpretation of the CI in the case of electricity expenditure is 
slightly unusual. Here, decline in the value of CI would mean that the burden of 
electricity expenditure on poor households are increasing which can be taken as a 
worse off case rather than better off case. Therefore, higher the value of CI, lower will 
be the burden of electricity expenditure on the poor. In earlier we discussed the 
factors that affect the burden of electricity expenditure on households. Concentration 
curve is derived to give visual clarity (Figure 5.1 to 5.6). Y-axis in concentration 
curve shows the cumulative share of expenditure on electricity while X-axis 
represents the cumulative population percentage. The value of CI for rural Orissa has 
increased from 0.19 in 1993-94 to 0.37 in 1999-2000, which implies that the burden 
of electricity expenditure on the poor have declined. But this is not due to the 
reduction in price rather reduction in access and overall consumption by the bottom 
quintiles following drastic increase in price. During the same period, for rural West 
Bengal, CI increased from 0.15 to 0.32. This is on account of drastic increase in the 
electricity expenditure by upper quintiles, i.e., the share of upper quintiles in total 
expenditure on electricity has experienced very significant increase (Table 7). The 
value of CI has declined for urban areas in both the states but more progressively for 
West Bengal. This would mean that burden of expenditure on electricity for the poor 
have increased in urban areas. 
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Figure 5: Concentration Curve for Expenditure on Electricity 
Fig 5.1: Rural Orissa
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Fig 5.2: Rural West Bengal
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Fig 5.3: Urban Orissa
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Fig 5.4: Urban West Bengal
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Fig 5.5: Total Orissa
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Fig 5.6: Total West Bengal
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7. Conclusion 
From the analysis of NSS data (50th and 55th round) we found that ignorance of 
policy towards possible negative impacts of power sector reforms on poor sections of 
society have left the poor at losers end. The situation of poor in a non-reform state 
like West Bengal is better than that of Orissa, which went for reform in 1995-96. Poor 
in West Bengal have definitely faired better than the poor of Orissa both in terms of 
access and burden of expenditure. The inability of Staff Appraisal Report to spell out 
any instrument to mitigate the possible negative effect of power sector reform on poor 
was the most important weakness of the World Bank‟s reform package. It is 
surprising to see that even though academic works by World Bank experts have 
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always recognised the undesirable impacts of infrastructure reforms on poor. The 
practice has been far away from those recommendations. 
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Appendix -1 
 The Talcher Thermal power station of the OSEB has been transferred to 
NTPC (3
rd
 june 1995) 
 The OSEB was Corporatised into the Grid Corporation of Orissa (GRIDCO) 
with wiring and distribution functions and the Orissa Hydro Power 
Corporation (OHPC) in charge of the hydropower projects (1 April 1996). 
 The Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission (OERC) established (august 
1996) 
a) Issued seven tariff orders till date   
b) Level of cross subsidy is being reduced  
c)  Tariff has experienced a huge hike 
 The Orissa Power generation corporation (OPGC) which was established in 
1984 got privatised in 1998 with transfer of 49 percent of stake to the private 
operator , AES consortium, for Rs 603 Crore. 
 The distribution and retail supply of electricity was vested in four distribution 
companies initially as wholly owned subsidiary companies of the GRIDCO, 
namely the Central Electricity Supply Company of Orissa limited (CESCO), 
the North Eastern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa limited (NESCO), the 
Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa limited (SOUTHCO) and the 
Western Electricity Supply Company of Orissa limited (WESCO). Three of 
these distribution companies i.e., except the CESCO were privatised on 1st 
April 1999 (acquired by BSES) and the CESCO on 1st September 1999 after 
dis-investment of its 51 percent share (Acquired by AES consortium, a global 
Power company from US but now the CESCO is administered by a 
government official as it backed AES backed out from managerial 
responsibility of the company). The GRIDCO received Rs 1.6 billion for 51 
percent of the stake of the distribution companies (DISTCOS). While the 
GRIDCO retains only high voltage wiring business under single buyer model. 
Figure 1 depicts the process of restructuring of the Orissa Electricity board 
(OSEB).  
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Appendix 2 
Table : Monthly average household total consumption expenditure (HMCE) and their 
coefficient of variation 
 
  Households with Access to Electricity Households without Access to Electricity 
 Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Quantile Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV 
 West Bengal -1993-94 West Bengal 1993-94 
1 608.67 3.71 605.52 3.73 595.11 3.79 568.54 3.97 577.86 3.90 571.30 3.95 
2 893.18 2.53 1065.37 2.12 932.15 2.42 892.56 2.53 1021.62 2.21 917.20 2.46 
3 1180.24 1.91 1529.87 1.47 1248.85 1.81 1160.95 1.94 1475.62 1.53 1223.15 1.84 
4 1522.53 1.48 2184.90 1.03 1691.86 1.33 1511.60 1.49 2123.30 1.06 1645.57 1.37 
5 2965.95 0.76 4292.68 0.53 3420.47 0.66 2755.49 0.82 3453.56 0.65 3087.63 0.73 
Total  2149.54 1.05 2346.65 0.96 2284.10 0.99 1297.21 1.74 1155.57 1.95 1278.23 1.76 
 Orissa  1993-94 Orissa  1993-94 
1 387.81 5.82 580.43 3.89 389.42 5.79 377.53 5.98 558.18 4.04 391.79 5.76 
2 649.78 3.47 1013.64 2.23 680.53 3.31 649.27 3.47 1003.86 2.25 678.24 3.33 
3 902.38 2.50 1482.90 1.52 943.65 2.39 872.27 2.59 1431.91 1.58 922.01 2.45 
4 1199.42 1.88 2088.25 1.08 1305.37 1.73 1176.06 1.92 2017.78 1.12 1259.79 1.79 
5 2318.06 0.97 3574.71 0.63 2589.92 0.87 1965.19 1.15 3688.84 0.61 2188.29 1.03 
Total  1699.45 1.33 2106.09 1.07 1865.45 1.21 935.09 2.41 1271.15 1.77 959.81 2.35 
 West Bengal  1999-2000 West Bengal 1999-2000 
1 1098.44 2.05 1166.11 1.93 1079.09 2.09 1046.57 2.16 1172.45 1.92 1068.94 2.11 
2 1584.99 1.42 2036.33 1.11 1671.91 1.35 1581.30 1.43 1995.52 1.13 1650.18 1.37 
3 2048.27 1.10 2833.80 0.80 2198.33 1.03 2044.11 1.10 2730.62 0.83 2173.21 1.04 
4 2649.00 0.85 3980.16 0.57 2913.99 0.77 2615.62 0.86 3877.88 0.58 2849.16 0.79 
5 4388.23 0.51 7776.51 0.29 5619.34 0.40 4207.53 0.54 6462.48 0.35 4730.35 0.48 
Total  2953.97 0.76 3986.48 0.57 3534.56 0.64 2157.99 1.05 2184.15 1.03 2160.48 1.04 
 Orissa  1999-2000 Orissa  1999-2000 
1 687.29 3.28 956.87 2.36 726.47 3.11 644.00 3.50 895.00 2.52 672.72 3.35 
2 1072.45 2.10 1594.39 1.41 1131.48 1.99 1068.71 2.11 1575.95 1.43 1121.65 2.01 
3 1428.11 1.58 2261.24 1.00 1572.71 1.43 1446.70 1.56 2248.12 1.00 1534.04 1.47 
4 1958.63 1.15 3124.93 0.72 2196.24 1.03 1939.32 1.16 3047.65 0.74 2096.91 1.08 
5 3819.82 0.59 5678.11 0.40 4253.29 0.53 3267.67 0.69 5623.38 0.40 3608.37 0.63 
Total  2782.00 0.81 3234.62 0.70 2973.96 0.76 1507.54 1.50 1889.80 1.19 1541.40 1.46 
Source: Calculated from NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure 
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Appendix 3 
Table: Average expenditure on electricity by households and co-efficient of 
variations.  
Quantile with and without Access to Electricity with Access to Electricity 
 Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
 Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV Mean CV 
 
 Orissa 1993-94 Orissa 1993-94 
1 0.46 1183.14 8.43 64.01 0.78 695.88 23.52 9.98 8.43 27.85 20.67 11.35 
2 2.09 258.20 19.17 28.14 2.74 196.65 43.75 5.36 19.17 2.50 40.31 5.82 
3 5.42 99.54 35.26 15.30 7.26 74.28 61.99 3.79 35.26 2.91 57.30 4.10 
4 8.89 60.67 52.76 10.22 13.11 41.13 65.22 3.60 52.76 3.39 63.39 3.70 
5 26.84 20.10 84.68 6.37 41.31 13.06 77.91 3.01 84.68 6.61 81.18 2.89 
Total  8.74 61.70 40.14 13.44 13.04 41.35 67.22 3.49 71.05 2.71 68.78 3.41 
 
Orissa 1999-2000 
Orissa 1999-2000 
1 1.65 525.94 19.90 43.58 3.12 277.56 73.24 3.20 50.93 4.61 61.62 3.81 
2 5.06 171.42 46.45 18.67 7.53 115.19 61.75 3.80 115.11 2.04 60.84 3.86 
3 9.06 95.75 67.29 12.89 16.90 51.31 88.51 2.65 117.94 1.99 99.78 2.35 
4 19.63 44.17 116.07 7.47 31.99 27.11 105.42 2.23 147.39 1.59 118.45 1.98 
5 74.47 11.64 172.87 5.02 103.95 8.34 161.27 1.46 192.96 1.22 168.55 1.39 
Total 21.99 39.44 84.61 10.25 32.71 26.51 128.24 1.83 138.73 1.69 132.86 1.77 
 
West Bengal 1993-94 West Bengal 1993-94 
1 0.71 765.26 6.68 81.66 2.20 247.75 21.07 11.14 19.97 11.75 20.13 11.66 
2 0.76 715.76 15.45 35.28 2.74 199.17 21.71 10.81 35.41 6.63 28.09 8.36 
3 2.12 257.01 30.92 17.63 6.58 82.87 30.13 7.79 46.87 5.01 37.60 6.24 
4 4.11 132.63 51.17 10.66 13.42 40.64 34.31 6.84 63.40 3.70 45.72 5.13 
5 12.48 43.71 111.40 4.90 48.61 11.22 42.57 5.51 119.97 1.96 82.32 2.85 
Total 4.04 135.03 43.15 12.64 14.71 37.06 36.55 6.42 68.13 3.44 58.11 4.04 
 
West Bengal 1999-2000 West Bengal 1999-200 
1 3.48 352.97 27.74 44.23 7.65 160.37 42.15 5.57 52.10 4.50 45.15 5.20 
2 6.56 187.03 46.87 26.18 11.89 103.17 50.48 4.65 76.41 3.07 57.62 4.07 
3 10.44 117.53 86.50 14.18 19.05 64.40 59.19 3.97 110.46 2.12 71.44 3.29 
4 14.91 82.28 133.83 9.17 36.97 33.19 69.09 3.40 152.60 1.54 95.61 2.45 
5 38.96 31.49 274.45 4.47 123.25 9.95 100.49 2.34 289.04 0.81 186.69 1.26 
Total 14.87 82.49 113.96 10.77 39.98 30.69 74.93 3.13 151.68 1.55 118.09 1.99 
Source: Calculated from NSS 50
th
 and 55
th
 round survey on consumption expenditure 
 
 
